Law of the Surf by Fitzgerald, Brian & Harrison, Joanne
Published as:                                                                                                                                                                   
Fitzgerald, Brian and Harrison, Joanne (2003) Law of the Surf. Australian Law Journal 77:pp. 109-116. 
 
LAW OF THE SURF 
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As the weather heats up and thoughts turn to a trip to the beach for a refreshing swim 
and bodysurf one cannot help but think of the series of cases over the last ten years 
concerning surf related injuries.  It is timely especially in light of the current review of 
the law of negligence to consider the difficult question of liability and the surf. 
 
The Parties 
 
“The beach” as we might colloquially describe it, attracts a unique mix of people:   
beach walkers, sunbathers, athletes, families, swimmers, bodysurfers, boogie-board 
riders, surfboard riders, kite surfers, sailboard riders and lifesavers to name a few. On 
a hot Australian summer day the beach is inundated with beach goers wishing to 
escape the discomfort of a heat wave.  
 
The beach is part of Australian folklore and beach going is without doubt a leading 
Australian pastime.   Accidents that occur at the beach are similar in many respects to 
accidents that occur elsewhere although identification and location of the defendant in 
surfing related accidents has sometimes been an issue. The actions we have seen in 
large part involve an injured swimmer suing a local authority and/or lifesaving 
organisation.  In a number of these cases the local authority is alleged to be 
vicariously liable for the actions of the lifesaving clubs.1  
 
                                                 
1 B. Charrington, “Surf Related Litigation: Keeping Your Case Between the Flags” (2002) 53 
PLAINTIFF 6. On liability for the acts of third parties consider: Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre 
Pty Ltd v Anzil [2000] HCA 61 
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Outdoors and Sporting Cases 
 
The case that has brought attention to this topic most recently is Swain v Waverley 
Municipal Council2.   The plaintiff in this case was rendered an incomplete 
quadriplegic as a result of diving into the surf and striking a sandbar in a flagged area 
at Bondi beach. The evidence showed the sandbar was visible from the vantage point 
of the lifesavers on duty. Following a jury verdict Swain was awarded an amount of 
$3.75 million in damages.3 However on 22 July 2002, Giles JA in the matter of 
Waverley Municipal Council v Swain4 ordered a stay of proceedings on the judgement 
in the light of the pending appeal. 
 
The law of negligence has developed significantly over the 22 years since the decision 
in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt5.  That case concerned an accident at Tuggerah Lakes 
in New South Wales in 1967.  Mr Shirt was water skiing when he fell and struck his 
head on the bed of the lake rendering him a quadriplegic.  Mr Shirt claimed that he 
had believed that the part of the lake in which he fell was deeper than he appreciated.  
The basis of his belief, he alleged, was his interpretation of a sign that projected above 
the water in the vicinity of where he fell which bore the words “DEEP WATER”.  He 
explained that the sign faced the shoreline of the lake and that he understood this to 
mean that all the water beyond and beside the sign was deep water and thereby he was 
encouraged to ski in the manner that caused his accident.  The sign actually referred to 
water in front of the sign.  The High Court in this case held that it was open for a jury 
to find that the Council had been negligent. 
 
Since that case was decided there has been a series of cases concerning liability for 
people in the surf and also for people in natural surrounds.  Mostly recently in Romeo 
v Conservation Commission of the Northern Territory6 the High Court refused to 
impose liability on the Conservation Commission of the Northern Territory in 
circumstances where a 16-year-old girl adversely affected by alcohol was seriously 
                                                 
2 NSWSC  No 20261/2000 
3 This amount reflects an allowance for contributory negligence of twenty five per cent. About one hour 
before the accident Swain had consumed a 750ml bottle of beer and the night before had taken one 
tablet of ecstasy.  
4 NSWCA No 40419/2002. 
5 (1980) 146 CLR 40 
6 (1998) 192 CLR 431 
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injured after falling 6.5 metres from the top of Dripstone Cliffs onto Casurina Beach 
in suburban Darwin late at night.  The girl had fallen off the cliff after having 
surmounted a small barrier at the perimeter of the car park. It was argued that the 
Conservation Commission was negligent in failing to warn of the presence of the cliff 
or to erect a fence or other barrier at the edge of the cliff. The Court held that there 
was no reason in this instance why the Conservation Commission should carry the 
blame as the risk was obvious and to hold otherwise would have untold effects on 
access to the natural environment throughout the country.    
 
A significant case especially in relation to surf related liability is that of Nagle v 
Rottnest Island Authority7 where the High Court held that the Rottnest Island 
Authority was liable for injury sustained by Nagle who had been injured in a diving 
accident and suffered severe spinal injury becoming a quadriplegic.  Nagle had dived 
into an area of Rottnest Island known as the Basin and in diving into the water had hit 
a partially-submerged rock-ledge.  The Basin was described as small sand-bottom u-
shaped bathing area on the northern coast of the island surrounded on all sides except 
the north by a flat-rock area known as a wave-platform, approximately 25cm above 
low-tide level. 
 
In this instance, it was held that the Rottnest Island Authority should have erected a 
sign to warn of the dangers.  The High Court explained that it was clear that the rocks 
existed and that the Authority knew of this hidden danger, therefore, a warning sign 
should have been erected, especially in a context where the Authority encouraged 
people to use the Basin as a swimming facility.  
 
The recent High Court decision of Brodie v Singleton Shire Council8 should also be 
mentioned.  This decision concerned the repair of highways and the abolition of an 
“immunity” from liability held by authorities having responsibilities for highways for 
failing to act to repair such highways.  The Court held that whether an authority is 
liable for damage arising from accidents occurring from a highway that is not 
adequately repaired, should no longer be contingent on a non-feasance/misfeasance 
                                                 
7 (1993) 177 CLR 423 
8 [2001] HCA 29 
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dichotomy, but more generally on the test of whether the authority had failed to 
exercise the due standard of care. 
 
In Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd9 the plaintiff had injured an eye while 
playing indoor cricket. The High Court held that the defendant was not negligent in 
failing to provide signs warning of the dangers of indoor cricket and/or protective 
equipment (such as a helmet with a face guard) to players, as the danger was part of 
the normal risk of playing the sport.  Interestingly, Kirby J in dissent explained that 
his judgement in Romeo should not be taken out of context and that “obviousness of 
risk” per se will not wipe away a duty to warn.10  
 
Surf Related Cases 
 
This series of cases involves claims of inadequate supervision of a patrolled area and 
lack of adequate signage warning of hidden or natural dangers including dangerous 
surf conditions and sandbars.  
 
Fitzpatrick v Maroochy Shire Council11 involved a 73-year-old plaintiff, who had 
suffered a displaced fracture of her left humerus and a fracture of her left radial neck 
after being hit by a body-board or boogie-board in the flagged areas at Maroochydore 
on the Sunshine Coast, north of Brisbane. Dodds DCJ refused to find the Maroochy 
Shire Council liable; largely on the basis he was unconvinced on the evidence before 
him, that to allow the riding of body-boards in the flagged area would significantly 
increase the risk of injury. 
 
Fitzpatrick can be compared with the New South Wales Supreme Court cases of 
Glasheen v The Council of the Municipality of Waverley12  and Municipality of 
Waverley v Bloom13.  Rebecca Glasheen, a 14 year old, was injured while surfing on a 
foam surfboard in white water between the flags at Bondi Beach. She was rendered a 
quadriplegic by either being hit by a fibre glass surfboard or by hitting her head on the 
                                                 
9 [2002] HCA 9 
10 Ibid., at paras [127] – [128] 
11 [1999] QDC 236. See further P. Tully “Should We Swim Between the Flags?” (1999) 19 Proctor 22; 
K Tronc, “A Plaintiff Lawyer’s Guide For Board Injuries to Swimmers” (2000) 38 PLAINTIFF 6  
12 (1990) Aust. Torts Reports 81-016 
13 [1999] NSWCA 229 
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seabed in taking evasive action.   One lifesaver was on duty at the time and said that 
he had not seen any surfboard riders in the flagged area. As there were found to be 
surfboard riders in the flagged area in fact, Sharpe J held that the lifesaver had failed 
to adequately supervise the flagged area.14  
 
Bloom was injured in the surf at Tamarama Beach in February 1994 where he was 
body-surfing between the flags, some 60 or 70 metres from the beach.  As Bloom rode 
a wave, he was struck in the neck by a fibreglass surfboard.  The surfboard-rider 
paddled off, Bloom struggled to the beach and collapsed in the sand.  Bloom was 
awarded an amount of $39,911.81 plus costs on the basis of the local authority’s 
negligence. The Court of Appeal confirming the decision of the trial judge held that 
negligence had been established on the basis that there were no beach inspectors on 
the beach at the time of the accident and that there were insufficient patrol members 
on the beach at the time of the accident.   
 
In contrast to Bloom, is the case of Sutherland Shire Council v Kukovec; Elouera Surf 
Lifesaving Club Inc v Kukovec15 where the Court of Appeal refused to hold the local 
authority and lifesaving club liable in an instance where Kukovec, while bathing in 
knee deep water between the flags at Elouera Beach, was hit in the eye by a fibre 
glass surfboard being carried towards the beach by a 10 to 13 year old child.   The 
court was not convinced that a child wading towards shore with a surfboard under 
their arm should have put the lifesavers on notice and as such there was no need for 
intervention at that point. 
 
Ipp AJA (with whom Meagher and Hodgeson JJA agreed) explained:  
 
In my opinion, at the stage the boy was seen to be walking out of the surf with 
his surfboard under his arm there was no foreseeable risk of injury.  A 
reasonable person charged with the duty of ensuring safety on the beach and in 
the sea in the area in question would not have taken any steps in regard to the 
                                                 
14 On the assessment of damages see: Glasheen v The Council of the Municipality of Waverley 
(NSWSC, unreported 17 August 1990, Master Greenwood) 
15 [2001] NSWCA 165. 
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boy’s presence.  Further, in my opinion, Mr Kukovec did not discharge the 
onus of proving that, before the accident, the boy had surfed in the flagged 
area or the buffer zone for sufficiently long a period for members of the club 
on duty to have noticed him as a potential source of danger.  Indeed, as I have 
indicated, Mr Kukovec did not prove that, before the accident, the boy had 
surfed in the flagged area or the buffer zone for sufficiently long a period for 
members of the club on duty to have noticed him as a potential source of 
danger.  Indeed, as I have indicated, Mr Kukovec did not prove that, before the 
accident, the boy had surfed in the flagged area or the buffer zone at all.16
 
A case that suggests a trend of things to come especially in light of the Panel of 
Eminent Persons’ Review of the Law of Negligence17 is Prast v The Town of 
Cottesloe.18 In this case, the Plaintiff had been dumped by a wave while body surfing 
at Cottesloe Beach in Perth. He was thrown on his head on the ocean bed very near 
the shoreline and sustained several injuries which rendered him a tetraplegic. Prast 
sued the local authority for failing to warn of the hidden danger of “dumpers”. The 
local authority responded by saying that the risk was so obvious it was not obliged to 
give a warning.  
 
The Full Court of the Western Australian Supreme Court rejected the claim that the 
town of Cottesloe should be liable for this injury.  Justice Ipp (with whom Wallwork19 
and Parker JJ agreed) explained: 
 
In my opinion the learned Judge was entirely correct in distinguishing between 
circumstances of the diving cases and the circumstances of this case.  In the 
diving cases there were hidden dangers that caused there to be serious risks in 
performing an act that would otherwise be relatively safe.  The risks of 
striking one’s head on a submerged rock obscured by the glare of the sun, or 
on a misleadingly shallow bottom, are not an inherent part of diving.  Those 
were hidden dangers that brought about the need to warn.  They are to be 
                                                 
16 Ibid., at para. [27] 
17 (2002) AGPS Canberra 
18 [2000] WASCA 274   
19 Justice Wallwork at para [57] added that “although there is no legal duty to do so, it would be 
beneficial to erect signs at popular beaches warning of the dangers of bodysurfing.”  
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contrasted with the risk facing all body surfers, that is, the risk of being hurled 
onto the seabed out of control by a wave that turns out to be a dumper.  The 
risk of so being dumped is inherent in body surfing itself, cannot be avoided 
and is well known.20
 
Justice Ipp went onto explain the role of body surfing as part of the fabric of 
Australian society:  
 
Body surfing is a traditional Australian pastime that has been indulged in by 
citizens of this country for a very long time.  There must be few who have 
never thrown themselves upon a wave in the hope of being carried by the rush 
of water to the shore and there must be few who do not know (from hearsay at 
least, if not personal experience) what a dumper is, and how it can throw a 
helpless surfer about.  This knowledge is generally learned relatively early in 
childhood and, in any event, is common sense.21
 
The judge then referred to Chief Justice Gleeson in Agar v Hyde22: “people who 
pursue recreational activities regarded as sports often do so in hazardous 
circumstances; the element of danger may add to the enjoyment of the activity.  
Accepting risk, sometimes to a high degree, is part of many sports.” Following on 
from this reasoning Justice Ipp explained: 
 
The risks of being dumped by the surf and thereby sustaining serious bodily 
injury are endemic to and part and parcel of the recreation of body surfing. …. 
Sea conditions often change.  Currents, rips and surges unexpectedly 
materialise.  Large and unexpected waves materialise out of the deep.  These 
phenomena are all capable of causing serious injury or death.  The currents 
and rips can take an unsuspecting swimmer far out to sea and can result in 
drowning.  Surges and unexpected large waves can hurl an unsuspecting 
swimming against rocks or onto the seashore, with serious damage to body 
and limb. 
                                                 
20 [2000] WASCA 274 at para [32] 
21 Ibid., at para [33] 
22 [2000] HCA 41 
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 Yet, to suggest that signs should be placed on all beaches in Australia 
indicating that swimming in the sea could lead to serious injury or death 
would, I suggest, be absurd.  The absurdity lies in the obviousness of the 
danger that attaches to the common, everyday, activity of swimming in the 
sea.  There is no need to warn of the ordinary risks that are so involved, and it 
would be absurd to require that to be done.  In my opinion, the risks attending 
upon body surfing fall under the same category.  Of course, where there are 
dangerous currents, or rips or surges or rocks or the possibility of the 
occasional king waves or other dangers that are peculiar to a particular beach, 
or part of a beach, special warnings may be called for, but that is not this 
case.23
 
The plaintiff in Bizaca v Manly City Council24 also failed to convince the Court that 
the Council had been negligent. The Council had been repairing a concrete wall on the 
foreshore for some months and it was alleged this resulted in rocks being embedded in 
the sand along the beach.  Zeljko Bizaca while swimming between the flags was 
unbalanced by a wave and struck a protruding rock.  It was argued that by placing the 
flags in the area in question it invited the public to swim there and also the lifesavers 
should have seen the rocks at low tide.  O’Reilly DCJ held that to require the Council 
to check for rocks manually or with a machine before and after the flags were set up, 
was too onerous.25
 
There is also litigation in progress in the Supreme Court of Queensland commenced 
by the family of an American man who drowned in the surf at Yaroomba Beach while 
attending a conference at the Hyatt Coolum Resort.26  Maureen Enright of 
Connecticut claims Coolum Resort Pty Ltd and the Maroochy Shire Council are liable 
for the death of her husband.    It will be alleged that lack of signage warning of the 
                                                 
23 [2000] WASCA 274 at paras [42]-[43]. 
24 Unreported District Court of NSW, O’Reilly DCJ, No 3528 of 2001 
25 Cf. Manly Council v Boylan NSWCA 15/6/95 
26 Enright v Hyatt Coolum WRT 2710/95 pending before Moynihan J of the Qld Supreme Court; see 
also Princess Hotels Int’l v Pearson 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 457 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Tarshis v 
Lahaina Investments Corp. 480 F. 2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1973).  [Postscript] See Enright v Coolum Resort 
Pty Ltd [2002] QSC 394 where the plaintiff’s claims were unsuccessful.  
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dangers of the surf on the pathways to the beach which is adjacent to the resort 
contributed to the death.27   
 
There is another series of cases relating to liability for injuries occurring on or near 
the beach.28
 
Comparative Case Law: The US 
 
In terms of comparative law it is interesting to consider the United States case of 
Fleuhr v City of Cape May29.  This was a case where a surfer had been injured in the 
ocean off the shore of a public beach at which lifeguards were stationed.  The injured 
person was an experienced surfer and had been surfing at First Avenue Beach on a 
day on which hurricane watches and warnings had been issued across the eastern 
seaboard.  The surfer was struck by large waves and tossed about in the surf, struck 
his head on the ocean floor and suffered a severe spinal injury.  Fleuhr sued Cape May 
on the grounds of negligent supervision, failure to warn of the dangerous ocean 
conditions and failure to protect him from the dangerous conditions. 
 
The trial judge held that the City was immune from liability under the Unimproved 
Public Property Immunity doctrine embodied in the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  The 
Supreme Court found that a reasonable jury could find that the surfer’s accident was 
caused by the natural conditions of the ocean, a situation for which a public entity was 
immune and that any negligence by the lifeguards was not a proximate cause of the 
accident. 
 
The Supreme Court explained that the surfer knew of the conditions of the ocean and 
appreciated the risks associated with surfing in such conditions.  The two lifeguards 
                                                 
27 M. Wilson, “Surf victim unaware of beach’s dangers” Courier Mail, May 28, 2002, 7; “$120m suit 
over drowning” Gold Coast Bulletin May 28, 2002.  See also the pending litigation in Mulligan v Coffs 
Harbour City Council: “Dive Victim ‘Smoked Pot’”, Daily Telegraph (Sydney) July 9, 2002, where an 
Irish national is suing the Coffs Harbour City Council for injuries sustained after diving into Coffs 
Creek. It is claimed that that the Council did not provide an adequate warning.   
28 Waverley Council v Lodge [2001] NSWCA 438 (29 November 2001); The Council of the 
Municipality of Shellharbour v Carter NSWCA 5/2/85. 
 
29 159 N.J. 532 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1999) 
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had approximately 20 years of experience as lifeguards with more than half of that 
time at the beach in question and found no reason to close the beach to swimming 
either before or after the surfer’s accident.  Any alleged negligence, the Court 
explained, on behalf of the lifeguards, is too remotely or insignificantly related to the 
accident to be considered a legal or proximate cause of the accident.30
 
There are a number of decisions from across the United States dealing with the notion 
of the Unimproved Public Property Immunity which is a notion that local 
municipalities should not be held liable for injury resulting from events that occur in 
nature or in places or areas they supervise in which dangerous natural conditions may 
arise that are beyond the control of the municipality.31
 
The relevant sections of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act provide: 
 
Neither a public entity nor public employee is liable for an injury caused by a 
condition of any unimproved public property including but not limited to any 
natural condition of any lake, stream, bay, river or beach: N.J.S.A. 59:4-8   
 
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for any injury caused by 
condition of the unimproved and unoccupied portions of the tidelands and 
submerged lands and beds of navigable rivers, streams, lakes, bays, estuaries, 
inlets and straits owned by the State: N.J.S.A. 59:4-9   
 
The comment on these sections expresses the policy determination underlying the 
Unimproved Public Property Immunity as follows: 
 
It is desirable to permit the members of the public to use public property in its 
natural condition, and that the burdens and expenses of putting such a property 
in such condition as well as expense of defending claims for injuries would 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 544-5.  
 
31 See: Kowalsky v Long Beach Township 72 F. 3D 385 (3rd Cir. 1995); State v Oliver 320 N.J. Super. 
405 (App. Div. 1999); Gonzales v City of San Diego 130 Cal. App. 3D882 (CT.App.1982); Knight v 
City of Capitola 6 Cal. Rptr 2d 874 (Ct. App. 1992); Pacheco v US 220 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2000);  D. 
Connaughton, J Spengler, B. Burket, “Liability and Warnings in Natural Aquatic Environments: A 
Case Law Analysis” (2002) 12 Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport 61.   
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probably cause many public entities to close such areas to public use.  In view 
of the limited funds available for the acquisition and improvement of property 
for recreational purposes it is not unreasonable to expect persons who 
voluntarily use unimproved public property to assume the risk of injuries 
arising therefrom as part of the price to be paid for the benefits received.32
 
An amicus curiae brief filed by Surfers’ Environmental Alliance – New Jersey (SEA-
NJ), and Surfrider Foundation argued that the lifeguard should not be held liable in 
this situation and they maintained that the action of the ocean, particularly the waves, 
could not be predicted with any certainty in advance.  “For that reason, even the most 
vigilant lifeguards are not guarantors of the safety of those who venture into the 
ocean.”33
 
Fleuhr suggests that when a person engages with the natural conditions of the ocean – 
nature - in physical and sporting endeavours, or recreational pastimes, they should 
accept the inherent risk of injury as part of the price of enjoyment of the activity.34  
Therefore, a body surfer going into the waves and suffering injury should not have the 
right to sue a local government or a surf lifesaving organisation.  The difference 
between Swain and Fleuhr, is that in Swain it was successfully argued at first instance 
that fault arose from the placement of the flags in a position where a sandbar was 
invisible.  The same argument would be made for distinguishing Swain and Prast; that 
the human intervention in Swain took this beyond a simple case of a human engaging 
with nature as in Prast.     
 
A general theme arising from these cases is that the liability of local authorities and 
surf lifesaving clubs in the instance of personal injury to body surfers will depend to 
some extent upon whether the natural conditions of the environment have played a 
major role in causing injury.  Following the United States doctrine of Unimproved 
Public Property Immunity we may see the courts much more willing to say, as in 
                                                 
32 159 N.J. 532 at 541 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1999) 
33 Ibid., at 538 
34 As Justice Ipp explained in Prast  “…the very aspects of body surfing that make it 
dangerous; provide the pleasures and thrills that make it popular”: [2000] WASCA 
274 at para. [34] 
 11
Prast’s case, that this is really a result of natural conditions and that the risk has been 
assumed.35    
 
Surfboard Riders 
 
An area of increasing concern is the interaction between surfboard riders especially in 
crowded surfing areas such as the classic surf spots along the beaches of Sydney, the 
Gold Coast and Northern NSW.  While there are occasionally reports of criminal 
cases concerning assault there has not been a reported case of two surfers suing each 
other in a civil action.  The ‘Law of the Surf Forum’ that was convened by Professor 
Brian Fitzgerald and held in Byron Bay in 2000 and then again at the end of 2001, 
came to the conclusion that self-regulation through the articulation, communication 
and enforcement of customary rules of conduct was paramount and a key to avoiding 
the need for litigation in this area.36  The most fundamental rule of surfboard riding - 
“Do not drop in” - is universally recognised.37  Yet rules beyond that are more 
difficult to determine.  The Surfrider Foundation along with other organisations has 
issued from time to time a charter of the rules of surfing conduct that they perceive to 
be commonly accepted.38  Most surfers would acknowledge that there is a code of 
conduct expected of surfers in the water and that this lore handed down through 
generations emanates from a core notion of respect for surfing, the safety of others 
and the environment. 
 
At the Law of the Surf Forum, Harvard Law Professor Terry Fisher explained (in the 
context of wind surfing) the limitations of an extra-legal customary code in the 
following way: 
 
                                                 
35 Cf. the notion discussed by Kirby J in Woods [2002] HCA 9 of a “commercial risk-creator”: paras 
[128] & [130] 
36 B. Fitzgerald and G Clarke (eds.), “Law of the Surf Forum” (2001) 5 Southern Cross 
University Law Review 228 
http://www.scu.edu.au/schools/lawj/law_review/law_of_the_surf_forum.pdf; B. 
Fitzgerald and G. Clarke (eds.), “Law, Culture and Knowledge of Surfing” (2002) 6 
Southern Cross University Law Review 178; M Mason, “Santa Cruz Surfers and 
Kayakers Butt Heads Over Waves” AP Breaking News May 13, 2002; I Gerard, 
“Overcrowding Rules the Waves” Weekend Australian December 30-31 2000; T. 
Kavanagh, “Tribal Law all the Rage” Courier Mail December 22, 2000 “Outdoors” 3.  
 
37 K. Pearson, Surfing Subcultures in Australia and New Zealand (1979) University of Queensland 
Press, Brisbane, 139-143.   
38 <http://www.surfrider.org.au> 
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Unfortunately, there are two problems with that response. The first is that not 
everyone abides by the code. Some people refuse to do so on principle. For 
example, in Internet chat rooms where these issues are debated (believe it or 
not), some wavesailors openly reject the basic rule that people going out have 
right of way. Other people violate the customary code, not because they are 
opposed to it in principle, but because they are impatient or greedy or tired of 
beginners messing up the waves. When people refuse or fail to obey the 
customary code, the informal sanctions available on the beach are not very 
effective. Fistfights are a poor, dangerous, and often unfair system for 
penalising violators. Other social sanctions highlighted by sociologists - 
criticism, ostracism, and so forth - do not seem to be working very well either. 
39  
 
Professor Fisher then outlined what the law might do: 
 
One possibility is that a legislature or court could adopt a formal set of rules, 
backed by a schedule of penalties, that paid no attention to the customary 
code. .. Another possibility suggested at the beginning of this conference is 
that courts could apply to wavesailing collisions the standard criteria of tort 
law, under which a sailor would be liable when his or her failure to behave 
like a hypothetical "reasonable person" under the circumstances caused injury 
to others. Although this suggestion is perhaps more plausible than the first 
alternative, few observers regard it as satisfactory.  
 
The only way for enlisting the formal legal system that seems to merit serious 
consideration would involve employing lawyers and courts to reinforce rather 
than displace the customary norms. How might that work? In extreme cases, 
criminal law could be brought to bear on persons who violated the customary 
code. Recently, the Supreme Court of Colorado upheld a manslaughter 
indictment against a skier who went down a slope at a reckless speed, hit 
another skier, and killed him. On rare occasions, criminal sanctions might be 
applied in an analogous fashion to wavesailing accidents. A sailor who, in 
violation of the customary norms, sailed over the back of a wave, collided with 
a jumper and killed him could be prosecuted for some form of homicide - 
perhaps manslaughter or even second-degree murder.   
 
In more routine cases, tort law could be harnessed. Courts could find sailors 
liable, not when they violated a general norm of "reasonable care" (of the sort 
I just mentioned), but when they violated the customary code and injuries 
resulted. There is precedent for such a strategy: Admiralty Courts in the 
United States and elsewhere sometimes deviate from the international anti-
collision rules when those rules are incompatible with local custom. For 
example, the customs that govern traffic on the Mississippi River do not 
follow either the international or the inland-waterway rules. When two boats 
collide on the river, the courts sometimes respect local custom, not the 
international regulations. So the proposal that tort law should incorporate by 
reference the existing customary code is not ludicrous.40  
                                                 
39 B. Fitzgerald and G Clarke (eds.), “Law of the Surf Forum” (2001) 5 Southern Cross University Law 
Review 228 at 249 
40 Ibid., 249-250. 
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However Professor Fisher was cautious about the role law should play explaining that 
“it would be costly”, and secondly “it would foster litigiousness.” His more subtle 
point was that:  
 
Sociologists tell us that it is very difficult for a legal system to capture the 
nuances of an informal code. That generalization seems plausible in this 
context. It is fairly easy to see how tort law could incorporate by reference the 
four customary "rules" I described a minute ago. It is much harder to see, 
however, how tort law could effectively incorporate the more general principle 
of courtesy and consideration. Increased reliance upon formal legal sanctions 
would thus almost certainly reduce the influence of the latter principle. That, 
in my view, would be unfortunate.41
 
The clear message for surfers and their communities is to articulate and uphold rules 
of good conduct and respect in the surf.  Importantly, such a customary code needs to 
incorporate notions such as mitigation and reasonableness, as in the “split second” 
decision making environment of the surf it will, at times, be much easier and thereby 
beneficial to sacrifice or mitigate a right of way in order to avoid damage.  
 
Facing any lawsuit in this area will be the claim that the plaintiff has assumed the risk 
of injury.  Like the plaintiffs in Fleuhr and Prast, the surfboard rider chooses to 
engage nature in what is a physical and potentially dangerous activity.42  However in 
line with the decision in Swain, will the actions of other participants/surfboard riders 
bring that human intervention that founds liability? And to what extent will their 
breach of the customary code determine liability before the courts?   We also need to 
keep in mind that every participant in a sport knows that a certain level of injury is not 
compensable.43   
 
Review of the Law of Negligence  
 
The Committee of Eminent Persons44 in the Review of the Law of Negligence45 has 
made a number of recommendations which promise to have an impact on the law of 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 251. 
42 Department of Natural Resources & Energy v Harper [2000] VSCA 36 
43 Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 9; Prast [2000] WASCA 274 per Wallwork J at 
para [58].  
44 Justice David Ipp, Professor Peter Cane, Dr Don Sheldon,  Mr Ian Macintosh 
45 (August 2002) <http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/review.asp> 
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the surf in particular Recommendations 11 and 14. Recommendation 11 stipulates that 
the provider of a recreation service is “not liable for personal injury or death suffered 
by a voluntary participant in a recreational activity as a result of the materialisation of 
an obvious risk.” An obvious risk is defined as “a risk that, in the circumstances, 
would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the participant”, 
“risks that are patent or matters of common knowledge” and a “risk may be obvious 
even though it is of low probability”.  A recreational service is defined in 
Recommendation 12 as “providing facilities for participation in a recreational 
activity” or  “training a person to participate in a recreational activity” or 
“supervising, adjudicating, guiding or otherwise assisting a person's participation in a 
recreational activity.” A recreation activity is defined in the same recommendation to 
mean “an activity undertaken for the purposes of recreation, enjoyment or leisure 
which involves a significant degree of physical risk”. The Report explains that 
Recommendation 11 is designed to reinvigorate the defence of voluntary assumption 
of risk.   
 
Recommendation 14 provides that “a person does not breach a proactive duty to 
inform by reason only of a failure to give notice or to warn of an obvious risk of 
personal injury or death, unless required to do so by statute.”  When enacted this 
Recommendation is designed to overturn Nagle.46  The Report notes that 
“Recommendation 14 applies only to the proactive duty to inform and not to the 
reactive duty to inform” and that “Recommendation 14 is an important adjunct to 
Recommendation 11 .. [as]  …exclusion of liability for the materialisation of obvious 
risks could be circumvented if it were open to a claimant to allege failure to give 
notice or to warn of the risk”.  
One proposed law which seeks to implement these principles is the Civil Liability 
Amendment (Personal  Responsibility ) Bill 2002 NSW.47  Section 27 (1) provides 
                                                 
46 Review of the Law of Negligence, 68. 
47 <http://www.cabinet.nsw.gov.au/civil.pdf> 
 15
that “A person (the injured person) is not owed a duty of care by another person (the 
defendant) to take care reasonable care in respect of a risk, or to warn of a risk, that a 
reasonable person would consider to be an inherent or an obvious risk.” 48
 
One commentator has suggested that these recommendations once enacted would 
override liability for negligence in the Swain type case. However the same 
commentator questions whether the human intervention of placing the flags removes 
the “obviousness” of risk?49  
 
Conclusion 
 
As you feel the white water rush over you this summer at one of Australia’s beautiful 
beaches you will now be reminded that the ocean like any other landscape is full of 
legal issues. For those wishing to engage with nature in a soulful activity note the law 
is tending towards saying you will bear your own risk.  However the extent to which 
local authorities and lifesaving clubs will be held liable for inadequate supervision 
and warnings is in a state of refinement. A clearer picture will emerge once we know 
the outcome of the appeal in Swain50 and better understand the effect of the revised 
negligence laws.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
48 See generally: ss27-32; 43-44. 
  
49 B. Charrington, supra note 1, 12-14  
50 See also Richmond Valley Council v Standing [2002] NSWCA 359; Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City 
Council and Ors [2003]NSWSC49 
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